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CONSTITUTIONAL/LAND USE—SMALL-TOWN POLITICS, BIG-TIME 
PROBLEM: ADDRESSING THE DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF EX PARTE 
COMMUNICATIONS IN QUASI-JUDICIAL MUNICIPAL PROCEEDINGS 
Ryan K. O’Hara* 
Town residents and politicians stand at odds over the conversion of a 
driving range and ice cream shop—a local favorite—into a big-box 
supermarket.  The town zoning board’s decision on an appeal of the 
store’s permit will determine the practical fate of a neighborhood, and 
the metaphorical fate of the town.  The supermarket, during an appeal 
of its granted permit, brings in new “local counsel,” an attorney-
politician who ultimately meets with four of five zoning board 
members individually, in-person.  He claims these meetings were 
merely to discuss “procedural questions.”  Circumstantial evidence 
suggests otherwise.  Upon judicial review of the board’s affirming the 
permit on appeal, the trial judge finds that bias played no role in the 
board’s decision, yet articulates no standard for when a finding of 
bias should be made in such circumstances. 
 
These facts are drawn from a real situation, and similar situations 
occur in different factual settings before municipal boards.  Despite 
this, Massachusetts (along with roughly forty-five other states) has no 
established law governing the effect of such ex parte communications 
on those quasi-judicial proceedings, a constitutional issue of due 
process. 
 
Four other jurisdictions—Florida, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington—
have addressed this problem, each reaching a different resolution.  
Idaho has a rule implying that undisclosed ex parte communications 
made to municipal boards in quasi-judicial settings are fatal to the 
outcome of the proceedings.  A Washington statute requires disclosure 
to avoid nullification.  Florida imputed a presumption of bias onto ex 
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editor, and motivator.  I would like to thank the staff of the Western New England Law Review 
for their efforts in producing this piece over the last year-and-a-half.  Most importantly, endless 
love and thanks to my family—particularly my siblings, Kathryn and John O’Hara, my parents, 
Laura and Drew O’Hara, and my grandmother, Jeannine Cole Pease—and close friends for 
making this, and everything else, possible. 
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parte communications, whereas Oregon takes the approach that no 
such presumption results from such communications. 
 
This Note describes the issue presented by ex parte communications 
in the municipal context; identifies the current rules and approaches 
adopted by jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, weighing their 
various strengths and weaknesses; and considers what guidance 
federal administrative law can provide.  Ultimately, it synthesizes, 
proposes, and justifies a model rule for jurisdictions that have not yet 
addressed this issue: a rebuttable presumption of bias, curable by 
disclosure on the record. 
 
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants . . . .”  
– Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis1 
INTRODUCTION 
Often, some of the most pressing legal matters faced by American 
citizens take place outside of the courtroom, in both formal and informal 
interactions with municipal government.  Prospective tavern keepers must 
go before municipal licensing boards to obtain hotly contested liquor 
licenses;2 landowners must consult local zoning and planning boards 
regarding the use of their property;3 and new construction must be 
approved under both state-based administrative safety regulations and 
permitting processes within individual municipalities that enforce those 
regulations.4  The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution guarantees the state cannot deprive a citizen of property or 
liberty without due process of the law5—how do these protections 
manifest in the less formal circumstances presented by municipal 
administration? 
 
1.  Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10, 
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45 r81.cf1 rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1910/
1913_12_20_What_Publicity_Ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC2L-44PG].  
2.  See, e.g., Mary Serreze, Easthampton City Council Delays Vote on Seeking 8 Over-
Quota Liquor Licenses, MASSLIVE.COM (Oct. 22, 2015), 
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2015/10/easthampton_over_quota_liquor_licenses ht
ml [https://perma.cc/3HEL-M7VK]. 
3.  See, e.g., Mary Serreze, Crowd Turns Out to Support Fort Hill Brewery at 
Easthampton Zoning Board Hearing, MASSLIVE.COM (Oct. 9, 2015, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2015/10/tcrowd_turns_out_to_support_for html 
[https://perma.cc/44TN-NGEQ]. 
4.  See generally, e.g., Mass. State Sanitary Code, 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 410 (2016). 
5.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
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Consider the following scenario:6 a big-box supermarket is intent on 
developing a new location in a small city.7  This new store will be placed 
on land that is currently the site of a soft-serve ice cream shop and driving 
range, a local favorite with a beautiful view of a mountain and church 
steeples.8 
The supermarket applies to the town zoning board of appeals 
(“ZBA”) for a special permit.9  However, the community fears that the 
new store would push out smaller businesses, create further traffic snarls 
in an already congested area, and replace a favorite local institution; these 
fears threaten to derail the permitting process.10  In response, the 
supermarket brings in a local attorney-politician, who contacts ZBA 
members, shows them plans and gets to know them personally.11  
Ultimately, the permit is denied in a split decision; however, the attorney 
participates in the drafting of the decision to give it a greater chance of 
success on appeal, via communication with the head of the ZBA.12 
When the denial of the special permit is appealed, the local counsel 
continues to meet personally with most members of the ZBA, despite 
being rebuffed by some.13  In some instances, he travels over forty-five 
minutes each way to meet with the members;14 in others, he calls them 
 
6.  The scenario is derived from the facts plead in the plaintiff’s opposition to summary 
judgment in Cernak v. Planning Board for the City of Easthampton, a Massachusetts trial court 
case.  See Pls. Mem. of Law in Opp. to Defs. Motion for Summary Judgment, Cernak v. 
Planning Bd. for the City of Easthampton, No. 10-035 (Mass. Super. Ct. Hampshire Cty., Mar. 
26, 2013) (on file with author) (hereinafter “Cernak Memorandum”).  While the facts, then, are 
necessarily those most favorable to the plaintiff, they are presented at face value here to illustrate 
the issue in its most vivid form.   
7.  Id. at *1.  
8.  See Mary Serreze, Stop & Shop, Tasty Top Owner, Mum on Supermarket Project in 
Easthampton, MASSLIVE.COM (Oct. 16, 2014), 
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2014/10/tasty_top_owner_and_stop_shop html 
[https://perma.cc/QF7V-FLC5].  
9.  See Cernak Memorandum, supra note 6, at *1.  
10.  See John Paradis, Get Tasty Top Treat While You Can, DAILY HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE 
(June 12, 2014), http://www.gazettenet.com/Archives/2014/06/paradis-hg-061314 
[https://perma.cc/3VWB-6BU2].  Paradis’s editorial, albeit penned several years after the initial 
permit was granted, eloquently articulates the common anti-Stop & Shop sentiment, writing 
about sprawl and classic New England charm:  
What I lament is that when the Tasty Top and its cool cone sign comes down, a 
piece of New England will come down with it . . . .  Easthampton has a beautiful 
mountain backdrop, old mills as well as a revitalized and repurposed mill, a 
downtown with character and attractive specialty stores, a bike trail, and a prep 
school.  What it won’t have now is an ice cream stand.   
Id. 
11.  See Cernak Memorandum, supra note 6, at *2. 
12.  Id. at *7–11. 
13.  See id. at *17–26.   
14.  Id. at *18. 
104 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:101 
both at their offices and on their personal phones.15  When members do 
meet with the attorney, they comment on alternative plans offered by 
him.16  The attorney hopes that these conversations will help “make sure 
that the message . . . is clear” and “assist[] the Planning Board in making 
a decision.”17 
Throughout the process, the existence of these communications 
remains unknown to those opposing the permit.18  After the ZBA reverses 
its original decision and grants a special permit, abutters of the property—
suspicious of impropriety in the process—sue for judicial review of the 
ZBA’s decision.19  Through discovery, the plaintiffs learn of the 
communications described above.20 
Naturally, all members of the ZBA deny any prejudice resulting from 
the communications.21  Some indicate they refused to meet with the 
attorney at all, uncomfortable with the unprecedented (for this ZBA, at 
least) situation.22  The supermarket and its attorneys maintain that the local 
counsel’s conversations were merely limited to procedural questions, 
despite a professional town planner designated as the sole point of contact 
between the ZBA and interested parties.23 
What recourse do the parcel’s aggrieved neighbors have?   When 
does lobbying—a fact of municipal life—become improper, or unduly 
influential?  What effect does the supermarket’s persistent and pervasive 
pattern of ex parte influence have on the judicial validity of the ZBA’s 
decision?  If the ZBA flatly denies it was influenced by these ex parte 
communications, how can a litigant successfully demonstrate bias?  These 
are not questions with easy answers.  Given the Constitution’s promise of 
due process,24 however, they must be answered. 
Ex parte communications in such settings—by definition, those 
outside of official procedure25—present serious issues under the 
constitutional mandate for due process,26 and dangerous potential for 
 
15.  Id. at *17–26. 
16.  Id.   
17.  Id. at *18 (internal citation omitted).  
18.  See id. at *2.   
19.  See generally Pls. Complaint, Cernak v. Planning Bd. for the City of Easthampton, 
No. 10-035 (Mass. Super. Ct. Hampshire Cty., Mar. 26, 2013) (on file with author). 
20.  See Cernak Memorandum, supra note 6, at *2.  
21.  See id. at *20–23.  The board members do not, however, contest that the 
communications occurred.  See id. at *24. 
22.  Id. at *20–21. 
23.  Id. at *22. 
24.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
25.  Ex parte, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Done or made at the instance 
and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, anyone having an 
adverse interest.”). 
26.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also infra Part II. 
2017] MUNICIPAL PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 105 
improper influence and moral hazards for practitioners and parties alike.27  
These questions must be addressed in order to ensure stakeholders’ rights 
and clearly delineate obligations for those conducting the day-to-day work 
of municipal law.  As a fundamentally local issue, this can only be done 
on the state level.28 
Very few jurisdictions have provided solutions to this problem: only 
Massachusetts, Oregon, Idaho, Washington, and Florida have had 
opportunities to squarely address it, reaching divergent answers.29  The 
federal administrative context, an environment in which many of the same 
issues arise, may provide some indication of a solution.30 
Ideally, to resolve this issue, board members facing circumstances 
such as those described above should cure the hazards presented by 
improper contacts by disclosing the existence and content of any ex parte 
communications, and providing parties the chance to contest and rebut on 
the official record any arguments advanced in those communications.  
However, where board members engage in ex parte communications, yet 
fail to publicly disclose them, their decision should automatically be 
rendered suspect and infected by bias—a presumption they can then rebut. 
This Note will first provide a brief overview of municipal 
government, including the powers it is given and the structure by which it 
administers those powers.  It will then turn in Part II to the constitutional 
issues raised in the context of those structures, depending on the type of 
power being exercised.  In Part III, this Note discusses the specific 
procedural and substantive issues posed by ex parte communications in 
municipal administrative context.  Part IV addresses what jurisdictions 
have done to resolve the issue, and the successes and failures of those 
solutions.  The Note then turns to federal administrative law for insight in 
Part V, discussing that body of law in conjunction and comparison with 
the state law examined in Part IV.  Finally, in Part VI, this Note proposes 
a model solution of this issue for any jurisdiction that may encounter it, 
synthesizing all prior proposed solutions to create a rule that balances 
fundamental fairness with the realities of the municipal context. 
I. MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY: SOURCE AND STRUCTURE 
Before addressing the constitutional problems that may arise when 
ex parte communications are made to municipal decision-making bodies, 
 
27.  See infra Part III. 
28.  See discussion infra Part I.  While the federal context is not totally irrelevant; see 
Part V infra; a national framework is an impossibility, as it would impermissibly intrude on the 
police powers reserved for states and their municipal bodies.  
29.  See infra Part IV. 
30.  See infra Part V. 
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it is critical to briefly sketch out the municipal context.  Municipal 
governments are a special type of corporation, and, accordingly, are 
exclusively creatures of state law.31  They “have no sovereign power.  
Instead, they enjoy only the powers conferred on them by state 
constitutions and statutes.”32  Municipalities may take many different 
forms—from autocratic mayors, to strong councils, to town meetings—
and the choice of form is left solely with the municipal government.33  The 
prevalent forms of municipal governance vary greatly between 
jurisdictions.34 
The powers of the municipal corporation are bound most narrowly 
by the municipality’s charter.35  The charter—when duly authorized by 
state law—is the source of all of a municipality’s power, defining and 
limiting its form and bounds.36  Charters can be understood as the 
municipal analogues to a constitution, although their creation must first be 
permitted by the relevant state law.37 
Typically, the charter will vest two types of powers in the municipal 
legislature: legislative and administrative.38  Legislative power is the 
authority to create law, whereas administrative power is the authority to 
enforce law.39  The classic test for distinguishing between the two involves 
examining whether the municipal action in question (often an ordinance) 
makes new law, or merely executes existing law.40 
Municipalities have authority to legislate on matters traditionally 
within the state’s reserved police powers—namely health, safety, welfare, 
and morals.41  The police powers have been held to provide sufficient 
grounds for zoning legislation.42  However, most jurisdictions’ state 
legislatures explicitly provide municipalities with the authority to zone in 
 
31.  See 2A MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 10:3 (3d ed. 2016) (discussing sources of 
municipal power, including state constitutions, statutes, and municipal charters, inter alia).   
32.  STEWART E. STERK & EDUARDO M. PENALVER, LAND USE REGULATION 18 (2011).  
33.  See MCQUILLIN, supra note 31, § 9:14. 
34.  Id. 
35.  See, e.g., Alvord Inv., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Stamford, 920 A.2d 1000, 
1011 (Conn. 2007) (“The charter serves as an enabling act, both creating power and prescribing 
the form in which it must be exercised.”).  
36.  See MCQUILLIN, supra note 31, § 9:3. 
37.  Id. 
38.  See id. § 10.6.   
39.  Id.  For more nuanced, in-depth treatment of these separate categories of municipal 
power, see discussion infra Section II.B.  
40.  See, e.g., Whitbeck v. Funk, 12 P.2d 1019, 1019 (Or. 1932); see also MCQUILLIN, 
supra note 31, § 10:6. 
41.  See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–87 (1926). 
42.  Id. at 395 (holding that particular zoning measures were sufficiently justified by 
reason of health, safety, and welfare).  
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zoning enabling acts (“ZEA”).43  Once a municipal government 
legislatively enacts zoning standards, it must also administrate the laws—
often this is done by delegation to a zoning-specific authority.44 
As a broad rule, delegation of administrative powers—including 
permitting, licensing, and enforcement—to boards or individuals is 
permitted, so long as they are merely to apply the rules.45  In the zoning 
context, this typically leaves the granting of variances, special permits, 
approval of subdivision plans, and many other property-specific 
determinations in the hands of administrative bodies with delegated 
power.46  It is before exactly these sorts of boards that the issue discussed 
in this Note arises.47 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
The Fourteenth Amendment demands that no state “shall . . . deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”48  
Where the municipal government wishes to take action that would impact 
“life, liberty, or property,” citizens are entitled to due process.49  Due 
process takes two distinct forms: substantive (examining whether the 
government had legal authority for its action), and procedural 
(determining whether the government took action in a proper manner).50  
This Note is concerned exclusively with procedural due process 
protections. 
Communications with public officials are not constitutionally 
 
43.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A (2015); see also ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH 
MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (1926), 
https://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct1926.pdf. 
44.  See MCQUILLIN, supra note 31, § 26:81.  Often, this authority is called the Zoning 
Board of Appeals (“ZBA”) or some other similar name; this Note will often use ZBA, or “board” 
more generally.  
45.  See id.  
46.  Id. 
47.  Note, however, that delegated executive power exists in many areas of the municipal 
government, not just zoning.  For example, boards may properly be given authority over 
administrating laws regarding licensing of amusement devices; licensing businesses for health, 
safety, and sanitary compliance; permitting weapons; and issuing liquor licenses.  See id. § 
26:87.  As will be discussed infra Part II, these determinations all raise the same constitutional 
issues.  This Note will retain its focus on zoning and land use authorities, but its arguments 
apply with equal force in all municipal administrative contexts. 
48.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing for due 
process protections against the federal government).  This Note primarily handles due process 
issues on the state level, so it will speak about the Fourteenth Amendment.  However, the 
requirements of procedural due process are identical under either amendment. 
49.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
50.  For a nuanced and detailed examination of these two closely related concepts, see 
generally Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural 
Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 847–48 (2003).   
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troublesome in a vacuum—indeed, in order to be an active and well-
informed member of the community, people should become familiar with 
those in their local government.51  However, in certain contexts, those 
conversations have the potential to be problematic.  Ex parte 
communications, those outside of official procedure, present a significant 
question in the context of determining what level of subsequent process 
satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment.52  To obtain any relief on that 
question, however, plaintiffs must first demonstrate that due process 
protections apply.53  As this section will discuss, doing so depends on the 
nature of the municipal action that is being challenged. 
A. When Does Due Process Apply? 
 The Fourteenth Amendment contains three requirements which 
trigger due process protection.54  First, there must be some state action that 
will affect the citizen.55  In the context of municipal boards, this 
requirement is easily satisfied: they are part of the city apparatus, and—at 
minimum—any grant or denial of permits is state action.56 
Second, the government action must threaten one of the protected 
constitutional interests: “life, liberty, or property.”57  A municipal 
proceeding is unlikely to deprive a citizen of his or her life.  Practically, 
property or liberty are the only interests a municipal board can touch.  In 
the case of zoning boards, their actions clearly impact the ways in which 
people can utilize their real property.  Licensing boards’ actions may 
damage a person’s finances58—both money and real property are 
 
51.  See generally Margaret Stimmann Branson, The Role of Civic Education, CTR. FOR 
CIVIC EDUC. (Sept. 1998), http://www.civiced.org/papers/articles role html [https://perma.cc/
62UC-QECW].  “There is no more important task than the development of an informed, 
effective, and responsible citizenry.”  Id.   
52.  See discussion infra Section III.C. 
53.  See WILLIAM F. FUNK, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 246 
(5th ed. 2014) (stating that the threshold question, before asking how much procedure is 
necessary, is whether any procedure is necessary).  
54.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  Note that some may consider citizenship a 
prerequisite for due process protections as well, given the text of the amendment.  However, 
there is great debate over when due process might apply, regardless of citizenship.  See, e.g., 
Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered, 47 CONN. L. 
REV. 879 (2015).  This Note will assume that any requisite citizenship is satisfied when parties 
are before municipal boards. 
55.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . .”); see Wilson R. Huhn, 
The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 
1380 (2005) (“[State action is] a key component of the Fourteenth Amendment—a threshold 
requirement that must be satisfied before triggering protection of our fundamental rights . . . .”). 
56.  See supra Section I.  
57.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
58.  Ivan B.K. Levingston & Celeste M. Mendoza, Liquor Licenses Prove Critical for 
Local Restaurants, HARV. CRIMSON (Apr. 25, 2014), 
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traditional property interests, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.59 
Municipal boards’ actions can also impact a person’s liberty.60  
Zoning regulations may determine whether a business owner can realize 
their vision at a particular location;61 the failure to obtain a liquor license 
could derail the dreams of an aspiring restaurateur.62  The vast majority of 
municipal boards’ actions will touch some citizen’s liberty or property 
interest.63  However, the mere showing that a government actor is 
impinging upon one’s liberty or property is not enough to trigger due 
process. 
Finally, the state action must affect a particular citizen (or group of 
citizens) on an individualized, fact-specific basis.64  Many actions the state 
takes are legislative in nature (or quasi-legislative), affecting each citizen 
equally; in such cases, due process protections do not apply.65  However, 
some actions impact only one person, or a discrete set of individuals based 
on facts specific to them.66  These actions are judicial in nature (or quasi-





59.  See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1972).  In addition to those clear 
examples of property, the concept can also extend to welfare entitlements and employment 
contracts—actual or implied.  Id. at 576–77. 
60.  See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 435–36 (1971) (holding that a police 
department’s branding of a woman as a habitual drunkard and resultant prohibition of sale of 
alcohol to her triggered due process); Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1347 (8th Cir. 
1993) (stating that, in some circumstances, government’s infringement on good reputation can 
be sufficient infringement of liberty interests). 
61.  See Serreze, supra note 3. 
62.  See Levingston & Mendoza, supra note 58. 
63.  Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“Without doubt, [liberty] 
denotes . . . the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations 
of life . . . generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”).   
64.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[D]eprive any person . . . .”); see also Londoner 
v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (ruling that where Denver sought to institute a road-
improvement tax on petitioners on the basis of their property abutting newly-paved road, 
petitioners were entitled to a hearing on the specific facts to determine their tax). 
65.  See generally Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) 
(holding that action raising the valuation of every property in Denver equally did not entitle 
each subject individual to due process claims); see also Pronghorn, Inc. v. Licensing Bd. of 
Peabody, 430 N.E.2d 842, 843 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that city-wide change in closing 
time of bars was not an individualized determination, so did not require individual procedure).  
66.  See Londoner, 210 U.S. at 373–86 (discussing how each petitioner should have been 
able to present evidence regarding their property’s relationship to new road before tax was 
imposed).  
67.  Id. at 386; cf. Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 446 (contrasting Londoner: “a local board had 
to determine ‘whether, in what amount, and upon whom’ . . . .  A relatively small number of 
persons was concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual 
grounds . . . .”). 
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Whether the municipal board’s action is an individualized 
determination is often the critical consideration.  In short, if a board’s 
action is quasi-judicial,68 it satisfies the individualized determination 
requirement, invoking due process.69  However, the inclusion of “quasi-
judicial” in that definition adds another level of complexity: which actions 
are quasi-judicial, and which are quasi-legislative? 
B. Distinguishing Between Quasi-Legislative and Quasi-Judicial 
Actions 
 Municipal boards have dual functions.  First, they are responsible for 
promulgating rules and regulations within their jurisdiction.70  Second, 
they are responsible for enforcing those rules and regulations, along with 
other laws of the community with which they are charged.71  The first is 
quasi-legislative (acting like a legislature) and the second is administrative 
(enforcing that quasi-legislature’s laws).72  While administrative board 
activity is not always adjudicatory, it will often involve making a 
determination regarding a particular citizen on particular facts: in other 
words, boards often act quasi-judicially when acting administratively, 
such as in granting permits.73 
Different jurisdictions have proposed and utilized many tests in order 
to determine whether a particular board action is quasi-judicial or quasi-
legislative.74  The consensus that seems to emerge is that quasi-judicial 
actions are those taken on the basis of facts specific to an individual, 
operating from a basis of established law.75  Quasi-legislative actions, 
 
68.  Quasi-judicial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Of, relating to, or 
involving an executive or administrative official’s adjudicative acts.”); cf. Quasi-legislative, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Not purely legislative in nature . . . .”).  
69.  See, e.g., Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst. v. Bd. of State Exam’rs of Plumbers & Gas Fitters, 
396 N.E.2d 457, 464 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). 
70.  See, e.g., Pronghorn, Inc., 430 N.E.2d at 843 (handling a challenge to Licensing 
Board’s decision to set closing-time for bars at 1:00 a m., a change from an earlier 2:00 a.m. 
close).  
71.  See, e.g., Neuberger v. City of Portland, 603 P.2d 771, 772 (Or. 1979) (reviewing 
grant of a special permit to one landowner); cf. Pronghorn, Inc., 430 N.E.2d at 845 (noting 
board was not wielding its powers against a single permit-holder).  
72.  Pronghorn, Inc., 430 N.E.2d at 843–45; see also discussion supra Part I. 
73.  See Pronghorn, Inc., 430 N.E.2d at 843–45. 
74.  See Fasano v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’r of Washington Cty., 507 P.2d 23, 25–26, 30 (Or. 
1973) (citing Illinois, Washington, and Ohio authorities in determining that test was whether 
action created rule of general applicability to an open class, or application of a general rule to a 
specific individual or interest); Pronghorn, Inc., 430 N.E.2d at 845 (identifying general 
applicability, invocation of public need, lack of charges, and no need for hearings followed by 
official findings on those charges as crucial factors weighing against quasi-judicial nature).  
75.  Cf. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst. v. Bd. of State Exam’rs of Plumbers & Gas Fitters, 396 
N.E.2d 457, 464 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that because plumbing code amendments were 
reflective of political policy choices, although they affected a closed class, they were not enacted 
in response to any particular person or set of facts and therefore quasi-legislative).  
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conversely, establish law with which all individuals must conform.76  As 
discussed supra in Part I, the zoning context is fertile with examples of 
boards acting quasi-judicially, including considering variances, special 
permits, pre-existing non-conforming uses, and subdivision plans. 
It is fair (although recursive) to say that those municipal board 
proceedings that satisfy the individualized determination requirement of 
the Fourteenth Amendment are quasi-judicial, and quasi-judicial 
proceedings are those that are individualized determinations.77  In the final 
analysis, the requirement of individualized determinations and the notion 
of quasi-judicial proceedings are two ways of describing the same 
fundamental notion: due process is only triggered where a particular 
person’s constitutional rights are under threat of infringement, on the basis 
of circumstances unique to that person.78 
C. How Much Process is Due? 
 Procedural due process requires, at minimum, notice of all facts in 
consideration by the quasi-judicial tribunal, opportunity to present and 
rebut evidence, and a neutral decision-maker.79  As far as what measures 
are actually constitutionally mandated, however, a more fact-specific 
analysis controls.  When a litigant claims he or she was deprived of a 
procedural measure required under due process, that claim is tested 
against Mathews v. Eldridge.80  In Mathews, the Supreme Court 
established a three-factor balancing test for whether a measure is required 
by the due process clause.81  If, in light of the competing interests of the 
state (both the public’s interest and efficiency/fiscal concerns) and the 
individual, the additional procedure would substantially reduce the risk of 
erroneous deprivation, the proposed measure is required.82 
Ex parte communications bear on all three essential fairness 
 
76.  Cast Iron, 396 N.E.2d at 464. 
77.  See Londoner v. City and Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908); Bi-Metallic Inv. 
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915). 
78.  Cf. Londoner, 210 U.S. at 386 (discussing individualized determination requirement) 
with Fasano, 507 P.2d at 25, 30 (discussing the character of quasi-judicial action by municipal 
bodies).  
79.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970) (discussing due process in context 
of welfare termination proceedings); see also, e.g., Chrismon v. Guilford Cty., 370 S.E.2d 579, 
593 (N.C. 1988) (emphasizing a zoning board’s more general “duty to exercise independent 
judgment in making zoning decisions . . . .”).   
80.  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
81.  Id. at 335.  The three factors are the individual’s interest at stake, the government’s 
interest at stake, and the risk of erroneous deprivation in the proposed measure’s absence.  Id. 
82.  Id.  In Mathews, the Court found a very strong state interest (effective administration 
of the disability benefits program), a non-critical personal interest (disability is not a need-based 
benefit), and a relatively low risk of erroneous deprivation, because the plaintiff only sought a 
pre-deprivation hearing, rather than a post-deprivation hearing.  Id. 
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elements.83  When a party contacts a board member, any relevant 
information discussed in that conversation is essentially an unnoticed, un-
rebuttable fact-finding session, with the board member—willingly or 
not—taking evidence off the record.84  Additionally, those contacts could 
introduce bias into the proceedings, whether nefarious misconduct or 
subtler forms of prejudice.85 
The mere fact that ex parte communications have occurred, however, 
does not violate procedural due process.  Municipalities would resolve the 
potential constitutional issues by developing a method for handling those 
contacts that satisfies the Mathews test.  There are no blanket rules of what 
procedure applies in a given situation.86  Rather, the Mathews test is 
intended to provide a flexible method to determine what procedure is 
necessary on a factual, case-by-case basis.87  After demonstrating that due 
process applies, it is the task of the party claiming its protections to 
demonstrate what specific provisions it requires.88 
III. THE DANGER OF EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS WITHOUT 
APPLICABLE LAW 
In most United States jurisdictions, ex parte communications occupy 
a gray area in the context of quasi-judicial municipal proceedings and their 
accompanying due process rights.89  Even if ex parte communications are 
recognized as potential violations of procedural due process in those 
settings, there is rarely a workable legal standard set forth.90  Because ex 
parte communications carry not only traditional due process dangers such 
as corruption and explicit bias,91 but also threaten adjudicators’ neutrality 
in more subtle ways,92 courts or legislatures must adopt a clear, uniform 
standard. 
 
83.  See id. 
84.  See Eacret v. Bonner Cty., 86 P.3d 494, 501 (Idaho 2004). 
85.  See infra Part III.  
86.  See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).  
87.  See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 
895 (1961)).   
88.  Part VI of this Note applies the Mathews test to a proposed solution, which would 
remedy due process concerns. 
89.  Only Oregon, Idaho, Florida, and Washington have developed clear, controlling law 
on the issue.  See infra Part IV.  
90.  See, e.g., Cernak v. Planning Bd. for the City of Easthampton, No. 10-035 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2013) (on file with author) (deciding on whether allegations of bias from ex 
parte communications sufficient to void a ZBA decision). 
91.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970) (guaranteeing a neutral decision 
maker). 
92.  See infra Section III.A.  
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A. Ex Parte Communications Present Substantial Danger of Bias 
 Certain types of bias, assuming they can be proven, are 
unquestionable—pecuniary interest, personal interest, prejudgment, and 
prejudice all violate due process.93  While ex parte communications likely 
arise in the context of those biases, proof beyond improper 
communications is needed to establish that level of apparent bias.  More 
difficult (and frustrating) cases arise where the ex parte communications 
are alleged to have subtly influenced the board’s decision, without any 
outright corruption.94 
Social sciences have demonstrated that bias can take many forms.  Of 
particular note are cognitive biases, which are generally unnoticed 
assumptions that play large roles in the decision-making process.95  These 
biases often take the form of heuristics—essentially, shortcuts the human 
brain takes in the decision-making process, without its user ever 
knowing.96 
Some of these cognitive biases seem particularly relevant in the 
context of otherwise innocent ex parte communications.  First, there is the 
availability heuristic, also referred to as the “ease of retrieval” bias.97  
Under this cognitive bias, decision-makers give the most credence to the 
set of facts they are most easily able to recall.98  Studies demonstrate the 
ease of recall is itself credited as information supporting the truth of the 
matter.99 
Ex parte communications thereby provide the communicator with an 
invaluable persuasive edge: mere repetition of his or her points, making 
them easier for the board member to recall, gives them credence and may 
influence the ultimate decision.100  The availability heuristic problem is 
further compounded by the concept of availability cascades: the more 
common and repeated a view is, the more available it is, and, therefore, 
 
93.  See, e.g., Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 255; Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722, 
725 (Or. 1980) (discussing explicit biases which would justify invalidation of municipal board’s 
decision). 
94.  See, e.g., Cernak v. Planning Bd. for the City of Easthampton, No. 10-035 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Hampshire Cty., Mar. 26, 2013) (on file with author). 
95.  See Jim Taylor, Cognitive Biases are Bad for Business, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 20, 
2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-power-prime/201305/cognitive-biases-are-
bad-business [https://perma.cc/CT35-5TBV]. 
96.  Id. 
97.  See generally Norbert Schwarz et. al., Ease of Retrieval as Information: Another 
Look at the Availability Heuristic, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195 (1991) (discussing 
availability bias).  
98.  Id. at 195. 
99.  Id. at 200–01.  In other words, people will generally afford more credibility to things 
which are easier to recall.  
100.  The effect is even greater if the communication is made in an unexpected context, 
e.g., by accosting the member in public—the communication is then more memorable.  See id. 
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the more credence it is given.101  On matters of great public concern, where 
one viewpoint may be communicated much more than another, the 
decision-makers may be further biased. 
Perhaps even stronger is the mere exposure effect, alternatively 
referred to as the familiarity principle.102  The familiarity principle 
describes a phenomenon often unnoticed in daily life, but well-
established: the more exposure one has to something, the more one likes 
that thing.103  This principle applies with inanimate objects104 and human 
beings105 alike.  Ex parte communications provide parties with the 
opportunity to show municipal decision-makers their individual 
personality.  The more familiar the decision-makers grow with the person, 
the more they unconsciously begin to like them and want to decide a case 
in their favor.106 
Two other related biases are worth mentioning: the framing107 and 
focusing108 effects.  An ex parte contact, in addition to the benefits of 
repetition, availability, and personal familiarity, provides its sender with 
an opportunity to frame the issue at hand without rebuttal.  Additionally, 
the familiarity and repetition of the issue may attract undue focus to this 
frame.  A combination of focus and framing biases may be impossible to 
cure once the decision-maker has encountered it.  Unless the 
communications are disclosed, there is no chance for the party opponent 
to challenge those biases by telling his or her own version of the same 
facts, or emphasizing different facts that may be just as significant.109 
B. Because of Obvious Biases, Subtle Biases, and the Extraneous Fact-
Finding Presented by Ex Parte Communications, Jurisdictions Must 
 
101.  Timur Kuran & Kass R. Junstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683, 683–84 (1999).  
102.  See generally R.B. Zajonc, Mere Exposure: A Gateway to Subliminal, 10 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 224 (2001) (discussing familiarity bias). 
103.  Id. at 224. 
104.  Id. at 224–25.  For example, mere exposure to Chinese characters—without any 
meaning attached—lead to subjects developing fondness for said characters.  Id. 
105.  See generally W.C. Swap, Interpersonal Attraction and Repeated Exposure to 
Rewarders and Punishers, 3 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 248 (1977) (arguing mere 
familiarity with positive humans increased fondness for them; mere exposure to negative 
persons, distaste).  
106.  See Zajonc, supra note 102, at 224. 
107.  See generally James N. Druckman, Evaluating Framing Effects, 22 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 91, 91 (indicating that the frame in which a question is presented—e.g., mortality 
rate versus survival rate—radically effects subsequent opinions and decisions on the matter). 
108.  See Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier if You Were Richer? A 
Focusing Illusion, SCIENCE 1908–10 (June 30, 2006) (discussing tendency to focus on one issue 
as critical when it may not be). 
109.  See id.; Druckman, supra note 107, at 91.  If multiple parties frame the issue and 
promote different points of emphasis, these cognitive biases may be neutralized. 
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Adopt Rules to Address Them 
 Ex parte communications in proceedings before municipal boards 
acting quasi-judicially will continue to present an unknown risk in 
jurisdictions that have not addressed the issue.  One of the groups most 
impacted by the current, cloudy situation are attorneys who represent 
clients in land use or permitting proceedings.110  Attorneys are governed 
by ethical rules, which have stringent guidelines on improper 
communications with both adjudicators and other attorneys’ clients.111  
When dealing with municipal board members—who may be both a 
decision-maker and represented party—what are the boundaries of the 
encounter?  Do ex parte communications violate ethical rules?112  Under 
the current state of the law, only the classic magic eight-ball answer 
suffices: answer unclear, try again later. 
All those who must have a matter decided before a municipal quasi-
judicial board also require a clear standard delineating their rights and the 
applicable law.113  “The American commitment to the rule of law means 
that every citizen is governed by the same laws, applied through a fair and 
equal judicial process.”114  Each person must be quasi-judged under 
equally fair due process conditions and must be entitled to equal review 
of those municipal decisions. 
Just as litigants would benefit from well-defined standards, judges 
would too: laws should be “clearly communicated and fairly enforced.  
Everyone is held accountable to the same laws.”115  Some uniform 
understanding of the due process implications of ex parte communications 
in quasi-judicial settings would significantly aid judges as they decide 
future cases. 
Last, but certainly not least, local municipalities and board members 
would be greatly aided by clearer standards, defining their obligations and 
providing greater predictability of outcomes.116  Currently, quasi-judicial 
decision-makers in many jurisdictions have no idea of their duties or 
 
110.  See R. Lisle Baker, Ethical Limits on Attorney Contact with Represented and 
Unrepresented Officials: The Example of Municipal Zoning Boards Making Site-Specific Land 
Use Decisions, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 349, 349 (1997). 
111.  Id. at 381. 
112.  Id. at 382–83. 
113.  See Ronald D. Keefe, Guarding the Rule of Law, 87 MICH. B.J. 12, 12 (2008); see 
also JUD. LEARNING CENTER, Law and the Rule of Law, http://judiciallearningcenter.org/law-
and-the-rule-of-law/ [https://perma.cc/8QKB-SSHS].   
114.  Id. 
115.  Id.  
116.  See generally Letter from Robert A. Butterworth, Florida Atty. Gen., to Hon. 
Truman G. Scarborough, Jr., Chairman, Brevard Cty. Comm’n. (Aug. 19, 1994), 
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago nsf/Opinions/8D781F3363CBEE6D852562210050A78D.  
This advisory opinion, sent in the wake of Jennings, was sent in response to a municipal board 
seeking definitive legal guidance on an unclear area.  Id.  
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obligations relative to procedural due process and ex parte 
communications.  Even where cities are aware of the potential problem, 
there is no easy or apparent solution available.117 
Were there a model rule available and adopted, these problems would 
be alleviated.  Land use practitioners would know more precisely how 
they were allowed to communicate with board members, and exactly what 
effects those communications might have.  Judges would work within a 
standard when ruling on issues of ex parte communications, instead of 
creating unguided precedent.  Board members and those before the board 
would know the law and their rights. 
IV. SOLUTIONS FROM THE STATES 
What rule might suffice to resolve the serious issues of bias and extra 
fact-finding, while remaining simple and flexible enough that any 
jurisdiction could adopt it?  Other states—the laboratories of 
democracy118—have already encountered the issue, and can be looked to 
for guidance.  While Massachusetts has only addressed the issue of ex 
parte communications in quasi-judicial proceedings before municipal 
boards in an obscure fashion at the lowest judicial level,119 several other 
jurisdictions have settled the issue more decisively and conclusively.  
Oregon, Idaho, Florida, and Washington have each attempted to resolve 
the due process problems presented by ex parte communications in 
municipal proceedings, each reaching divergent solutions.120 
As the discussion below will indicate, each approach adopted by the 
relevant state courts has its respective flaws.  However, some consistent 
patterns emerge after viewing the treatments in conjunction.  These state 
rules—both by their distinctions, and their shared features—provide 
strong models (and cautionary tales) on how any state court encountering 
ex parte communications in municipal proceedings should rule. 
 
117.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Berkeley City Manager to the Mayor and Members 
of the City Council re: Regulation of Ex Parte Contacts, Apr. 20, 2004 (on file with author) 
(attempting to proactively set plan on how to handle the issue; finding no guidance).  
118.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
119.  See infra Section IV.A. 
120.  See discussion infra.  In addition to Oregon, Idaho, Florida, and Washington, several 
other jurisdictions have handled the issue in a manner similar to Massachusetts—non-
conclusive discussion of the issue, with murky (if any) standards emerging.  See, e.g., Armstrong 
v. Turner Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 772 N.W.2d 643, 653–54 (S.D. 2009) (commenting on the 
problem presented by ex parte communications); City of Hobart Common Council v. 
Behavioral Inst. of Ind., LLC, 785 N.E.2d 238, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing potential 
problems related to off-the-record phone calls and conversations).  However, because such 
decisions are of very limited use in determining standards that jurisdictions could use going 
forward, they are beyond the scope of this Note.  
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A. Massachusetts’s Ambiguous Standard 
Massachusetts provides an illustrative example of a jurisdiction that 
has failed to develop a consistent standard for treating the issue, despite 
consistently encountering it.  As early as 1932, the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts (“SJC”) encountered allegations of ex parte 
communications tainting a zoning board adjudication.121  There, the SJC 
held that because the plaintiffs introduced no evidence regarding the 
nature of the communications or the weight afforded to them by the board 
in making its decision, there was no valid claim for relief.122 
In Alford v. Boston Zoning Commission, a Massachusetts appellate 
court ruled that because plaintiffs’ alleged harm came as a result of quasi-
legislative rather than quasi-judicial actions by the zoning commission, 
arguments regarding ex parte communications had no merit.123  Despite 
finding that the plaintiffs had no cognizable cause of action regarding 
those communications, the court’s decision seemed to imply they could 
be problematic in an adjudicatory setting.124 
Massachusetts’s most definitive treatment of this issue to date is 
limited to a single unpublished lower court decision, although that 
decision represents the only (quasi-) resolution provided to date.125  
Cernak v. Planning Board for the City of Easthampton—a case 
surrounding the facts discussed in the Introduction of this Note—forced a 
Massachusetts district court to address the issue directly, as it was the basis 
for the entire suit.126 
In Cernak, the district judge found that although there were many 
uncontroverted ex parte communications from the permit-seeking grocery 
chain, Stop & Shop, the plaintiffs had failed to show any bias resulting 
from those communications.127  First, the judge opined that the plaintiffs 
had been given a full opportunity to be heard at a public hearing, and that 
the board members had based their decisions solely on information 
presented at public hearings.128  Next, he wrote that evidence of ex parte 
communications from the first permitting process did have some probative 
 
121.  See Fandel v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of Bost., 182 N.E. 343, 344 (Mass. 1932) 
(“The precise point is whether the reading of these communications received subsequently to 
the public hearing requires the quashing of the proceedings.”). 
122.  See id. 
123.  Alford v. Boston Zoning Commission, 996 N.E.2d 883, 890–891 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2013). 
124.  Id. at 891. 
125.  See generally Cernak v. Planning Bd. for the City of Easthampton, No. 10-035 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Hampshire Cty., Mar. 26, 2013) (on file with author). 
126.  See generally id. (deciding on allegations of bias from ex parte communications 
sufficient to void a ZBA decision). 
127.  See id. at *6–7. 
128.  See id. 
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value as to Stop & Shop’s behavior and intent, but solely provided 
context.129 
Ultimately, the judge drew a bright line between ex parte 
communications implicating substance—which he did not observe here—
and those implicating procedure, which he viewed as harmless.130  In light 
of the lack of any proven bias, lack of proof of substantive discussions, 
and failure to show any consideration of ex parte communications in the 
ZBA’s decision-making, the judge refused to touch the ZBA’s decision—
even where it appeared clear that Stop & Shop had intended to influence 
the board. 
In short, the question is not whether Stop & Shop intended to influence 
the Board, but whether or not, through ex parte contacts with Board 
members, Stop & Shop caused the board to do what it would not 
otherwise have done.  In my judgment it did not.  While I do not 
condone Stop & Shop’s ex parte contacts, they were not so egregious 
as to affect the administrative process in a way that substantial justice 
was not done.131 
That quotation (frustratingly vague as it may be) represented the 
entire articulation of any standard by the court.  As will become clear in 
discussion infra, that standard does not cleanly fit within any of the rules 
utilized by other jurisdictions,132 nor with the approach used in the 
administrative context.133  Additionally, it is not sufficiently definite to 
provide any guidance to parties hoping to bring similar claims, and, as a 
district court decision, carries no binding precedential weight. 
Despite all of these deficiencies, Massachusetts law is relatively 
well-developed on this issue; although its standard may not be 
satisfactory, it at least implies that a showing of actual bias is required.134  
However, the notion of actual bias is already contemplated by procedural 
due process, under the prong of an impartial tribunal.135  Ex parte 
communications present a unique danger of subtler bias that, operating in 
conjunction with their nature as off-the-record fact-finding sessions,136 
renders ex parte communications severely problematic. 
 
129.  Id. at *7. 
130.  See id. at *6–7 (“[C]ontacts . . . did not include substantive discussions of the denial 
of the First Application or the merits of the Second . . . .”). 
131.  Id. at *8. 
132.  See infra Part IV. 
133.  See infra Part V. 
134.  See Cernak v. Planning Bd. for the City of Easthampton, No. 10-035, at *8 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Hampshire Cty., Mar. 26, 2013) (on file with author). 
135.  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970) (discussing impartial tribunal 
requirement in terms of pecuniary interest and prejudgment bias). 
136.  See Eacret v. Bonner Cty., 86 P.3d 494, 501 (Idaho 2004). 
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B. Oregon’s Presumption of No Bias 
Oregon was an early trailblazer in establishing the due process rights 
of parties subject to individualized determinations by municipal boards.  
In 1973, the Oregon Supreme Court (sitting en banc) heard the case of 
Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of Washington County.137  A 
property owner had applied for and been granted a rezoning permit, which 
would allow him to convert his parcel—previously only approved for a 
single-home residence—into a trailer park.138  Abutters to the rezoned 
parcel, hoping to avoid a trailer park in their neighborhood, brought an 
action in the district court to challenge the board’s permit.139 
Previously, Oregon had operated by the long-standing blanket rule 
that all zoning actions were legislative acts, and therefore assigned 
presumptions of validity.  The Oregon Supreme Court, however, held 
zoning actions that affected the concrete rights of individuals on an 
individualized basis were quasi-judicial, despite the old rule.140  Although 
the Fasano decision was about the scope of review that could be applied 
to certain board actions,141 its authorization of the characterization of those 
actions as quasi-judicial brought with it all the accompanying nuances of 
quasi-judicial categorization, including due process rights.142 
1. Movement from Broad Promises to a Narrow Rule 
Seven years later, in 1980, the Oregon Supreme Court was called to 
determine which due process rights ought to be afforded to interested 
parties in quasi-judicial municipal decisions.143  The court in Fasano had 
announced that “parties at the hearing before the . . . governing body are 
entitled to . . . a tribunal which is impartial in the matter—i.e., having had 
no pre-hearing or ex parte [sic] contacts concerning the question at 
 
137.  See generally Fasano v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’r of Washington Cty., 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 
1973) (holding that rezoning of property based on facts unique to said property was quasi-
judicial activity by the board). 
138.  Id. at 25. 
139.  Id. 
140.  See id. at 26 (“At this juncture we feel we would be ignoring reality to rigidly view 
all zoning decisions by local governing bodies as legislative acts to be accorded a full 
presumption of validity and shielded from less than constitutional scrutiny by the theory of 
separation of powers.”).  
141.  See id. at 25, 30.  Because deeming the board’s actions quasi-judicial removed the 
legislative presumption of validity, the test became whether there was a “justifiable basis” in 
the record for the board’s decision.  Because there was no ascertainable record to speak of, the 
decision in Fasano could not be so justified, and the lower courts’ decisions to invalidate the 
change of use were affirmed.  Id. 
142.  See supra Part II.  
143.  See generally Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980) (deciding 
whether, in context of quasi-judicial proceedings, off-the-record dealings and conversations 
between parties and board violated due process).  
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issue.”144  Based on that language, Oregonians who wished to challenge 
municipal boards’ quasi-judicial actions believed a showing of ex parte 
communications would serve as a de facto violation of parties’ due 
process rights, thereby invalidating the board’s action.145 
Neuberger v. City of Portland brought the language from Fasano and 
the resulting arguments into sharp focus.  In Neuberger, Portland’s city 
council had granted a special zone change to a developer, which would 
entitle him to a greatly increased building density on his land.146  
Throughout the permitting process, the developer had been negotiating the 
sale of another, abutting property to the city—Portland hoped to add the 
land to its city park.147  Additionally, the permit-seeking developer’s 
attorney contributed language to the drafting of the ordinance enacting the 
city council’s decision; the city did not provide the opponents with the 
same opportunity.148 
The opponents of the rezone were disturbed by these ongoing 
communications, arguing they must have influenced the board’s 
decision.149  Relying on the language from Fasano indicating ex parte 
communications were incongruous with the notion of an impartial 
tribunal,150 the opponents urged the Oregon Supreme Court to invalidate 
the city council’s actions. 
The Neuberger court declined the challenger’s invitation: “Fasano 
should not be read as adopting a mechanical rule that any ex parte [sic] 
contact touching on a matter before a tribunal acting quasi-judicially 
renders the tribunal, or its affected members, unable to act in that 
matter.”151  Rather, the court indicated, reviewing courts should focus on 
whether there was any real, apparent bias in the decision.152  “The issue is 
not whether there were any ex parte [sic] contacts, but whether the 
evidence shows that the tribunal or its members were biased.  In this case 
it does not.”153 
2. A Rule That Offers No Relief? 
By overturning (or, at the least, severely restricting) the portion of 
 
144.  Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30. 
145.  See Neuberger, 607 P.2d at 725 (noting opponents’ arguments that ex parte 
communications are condemned by Fasano and a default violation of due process). 
146.  See Neuberger v. City of Portland, 603 P.2d 771, 771 (Or. 1979) (granting petition 
for review and developing the facts of the case).  
147.  Id. at 725. 
148.  Id. 
149.  See id. 
150.  See Fasano v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’r of Wash. Cty., 507 P.2d 23, 30 (Or. 1973). 
151.  Neuberger, 607 P.2d at 725. 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id. 
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the Fasano decision pertaining to ex parte communications, Oregon 
essentially instituted a rule presuming that off-the-record communications 
were non-prejudicial.154  In practice, this rule has proved fatal to any 
challenges of zoning actions founded on concerns over ex parte 
communications or resulting bias.155 
Even in cases where circumstantial evidence of improper influence 
resulting from ex parte communications is substantial and compelling, 
Oregon’s Supreme Court has refrained from invalidating municipal board 
decisions without hard evidence.156  In 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco 
County Court, the court reversed the appeals court’s finding of bias where 
a board member ordering a municipal incorporation election had been in 
persistent, off-the-record contact with the aspirant town.157 
The group hoping to incorporate in 1000 Friends resided at a former 
ranch in Oregon’s cattle-country desert.158  One member of the county 
commission that ordered the election was a cattle rancher.159  Before 
ordering the vote, the rancher-commissioner had sold cattle to the ranch 
residents at a price well above fair market value.160  The record was replete 
with evidence that the ranchers had been eager buyers; that conversations 
regarding the sale were ongoing off the record throughout the 
incorporation process; that the sale had never been made public; and that 
the buyers had endeavored to keep the transaction “low key,” so as not to 
“embarrass” the purchasing county commissioner.161 
 
154.  See id. at 725–26 (Or. 1980).  The plaintiffs’ showing of ex parte communications—
indeed, strong contextual evidence that there may have been a trade-off of the permit for a 
favorable sale price on the concurrent transaction, not completed until after the rezone—got 
them nowhere.  Id.  Because they could not demonstrate any prejudice, in light of the fact that 
discussions of the sale were on the record, inferences of bias were not sufficient.  Id. 
155.  See Columbia Riverkeeper v. Clatsop Cty., 341 P.3d 790, 804 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) 
(noting no reported Oregon case had ever required the non-participation of a municipal board 
member in land use proceedings). 
156.  See generally 1000 Friends of Or. v. Wasco Cty. Ct., 742 P.2d 39 (Or. 1987) 
(representing the Oregon Supreme Court’s most recent statement on ex parte communications 
and bias in the relevant context).  
157.  Id. at 40–41.  
158.  See id. at 40; see also Oregon Experience: Rajneeshpuram (Or. Public Broadcasting 
television broadcast Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.opb.org/television/
programs/oregonexperience/segment/rajneeshpuram/ [https://perma.cc/9Q4F-NX9B].  The 
former ranch was occupied by followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, an Indian spiritual leader.  
Rajneesh and thousands of his followers, called “sannyasins,” moved to Wasco County in 1981 
and sought to build a utopian community, called Rajneeshpuram.  Id.  However, the commune’s 
gathering of many societal misfits—including transients, traumatized veterans, and children of 
the psychedelic era—chafed on the commune’s rural neighbors.  Id.  Tensions rose consistently, 
especially when the commune developed an armed defense force.  Id.  After attempts to become 
a recognized Oregon city were met with extensive legal battles, Rajneeshpuram existence ended 
in 1986.  Id.   
159.  See 1000 Friends, 742 P.2d at 40.  
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. at 40–41.  
122 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:101 
Despite this circumstantial evidence—seemingly enough to allow an 
inference of a favorable deal on property exchanged for a favorable vote—
the court held that the challengers had not made a sufficient showing of 
bias to invalidate the commission’s decision.162  In so deciding, the court 
wrote that invalidating local boards’ decisions merely because they appear 
unfair would lead to invalidating otherwise “correct and fair” decisions.163 
The court left the question open as to what would suffice to show that 
a decision was not correct and fair.  To be sure, there are situations where 
the mere existence of off-the-record communications does not implicate 
unfairness in the decision.164  Oregon’s legislature provided a specific 
avenue to ensure ex parte communications have no harmful effect: so long 
as any communications are disclosed on the record, including both the 
senders’ identities and the messages’ content, and parties are informed of 
their right to rebut that content, there is no due process violation.165 
If, however, those communications are left undisclosed at the 
municipal level, aggrieved parties are left with the doctrine expressed in 
both Neuberger and 1000 Friends.  Oregon’s statute, while a good first 
step in resolving the issue, provides no meaningful protection against ex 
parte communications that remain undisclosed—a gap that has not been 
filled by the judiciary. 
The courts have provided some suggestion as to what may be 
sufficient to prove bias in Oregon.166  If a party can demonstrate ex parte 
communications were made in conjunction with covert dealings, express 
or implied agreements, or as part of bribery, extortion, or the like, they 
clearly violate due process; however, the party needs absolute proof of 
those events, not the mere suggestion they exist.167  Because business 
deals may be made for many reasons, and board members are generally 
laypeople who have occupations beyond their municipal duties, plaintiffs 
must be able to demonstrate that improper influence was the motivating 
factor, above all other potential motivations for a deal.168 
 
162.  Id. at 46. 
163.  Id. at 44. 
164.  See Tierney v. Duris, 536 P.2d 435, 443 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (holding pre-Neuberger 
that there was no due process concern where ex parte communications were innocent and were 
disclosed on the record). 
165.  OR. REV. STAT. § 215.422(3) (2015). 
166.  See 1000 Friends, 742 P.2d at 41 (noting that challengers had no proof of express 
contingency of vote for incorporation election on above-market purchase of cattle; could not 
show a deal so one-sided as to obviously be a payoff or sham transaction; and were unable to 
prove any conversations occurred in the context of the business deal about the vote). 
167.  Neuberger v. Portland, 607 P.2d 722, 725 (Or. 1980) (listing how bias could be 
proved).  
168.  See 1000 Friends, 742 P.2d at 42–43; cf. Eastgate Theater v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’r, 
588 P.2d 640, 644 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (stating while a judge is expected to be detached, 
municipal board members were expected to be intensely involved in community).   
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In cases where undisclosed ex parte communications, viewed in 
context, seem to evince probable bias, there is a significant issue of proof 
for prospective challengers: how can they find the elusive, proverbial 
“smoking gun?”169  By the inherent nature of secret deals, they typically 
remain secret—any hard evidence of their existence rests solely with those 
who made them.  Requiring challengers to provide definitive proof of a 
scheme presents a near-insurmountable obstacle.170 
 Additionally, the explicit mention of only clear quid pro quo bargains 
accompanying ex parte communications as proof of bias171 is problematic 
for potential challengers, beyond issues of proof.  Subtler forms of bias 
can result from ex parte communications, which are not as obvious or 
malicious as the crass corruption imagined by the Oregon Supreme Court 
in Neuberger.172 
Oregonians who feel that ex parte communications irreparably 
influenced a municipal board’s quasi-judicial decision, yet do not allege 
an explicit scheme or exchange, may be left in the cold, given the 
indications that only apparent bias of a gross nature will ever vitiate such 
decisions.173  Unless ex parte bias left a board member with actual bias on 
the narrow issue in determination, such that he or she would be incapable 
of determining the case on the merits, it has not violated due process under 
Oregon law.174 
C. Idaho’s Automatic—Albeit Limited—Invalidation 
 Fasano’s impact was not limited to the Pacific Northwest.  Among 
others, Idaho viewed the Oregon Supreme Court’s holding as the correct 
view of the law, with its own Supreme Court holding in Cooper v. Board 
of County Commissioners of Ada County that, depending on the nature of 
a municipal board’s action, it could be either quasi-legislative or quasi-
 
169.  See Robert C. Cadle, Burdens of Proof: Presumption and Pretext in Disparate 
Treatment Employment Discrimination Cases, 78 MASS. L. REV. 122, 122–23 (1993) 
(discussing how presumptions are used in employment discrimination law, given sophisticated 
corruption and the resulting lack of “smoking guns”). 
170.  See Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 872 F.2d 1104, 1115 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating 
that circumstantial evidence is typically the only kind available in discrimination cases); 
Wheelock Coll. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 355 N.E.2d 309, 314 (Mass. 1976) 
(“We recognize, however, that proof of unlawful discrimination rarely can be established by 
direct evidence”).  
171.  See Neuberger, 607 P.2d at 725.  
172.  See supra Part III, Section IV.B.  
173.  See, e.g., Columbia Riverkeeper v. Clatsop Cty., 341 P.3d 790, 800–01 (Or. App. 
2014) (holding one of three county commissioners may have prejudged issue, but did not infect 
tribunal’s decision).   
174.  Id. at 804.  
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judicial.175  As in Oregon, a case questioning the effect of ex parte 
communications under the due process protections in quasi-judicial 
municipal proceedings ultimately followed.176 
1. An Equal and Opposite Reaction to Neuberger 
Idaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc. v. City Council of Boise 
presented a case centered on the demolition of a historic warehouse.177  
The Boise City Council had given the building’s owners a certificate of 
appropriateness for demolition in a proceeding found to be quasi-judicial 
under Cooper.178  Accordingly, due process required that all interested 
parties be provided with an opportunity to comment on the record and 
rebut contrary evidence, and that the city council’s decision be confined 
to that record.179 
However, in the process of making its final determination regarding 
the demolition of the warehouse, the Boise City Council had received 
multiple phone calls regarding the merits of the application for a 
demolition certificate.180  Not only had the councilmembers received these 
calls, they had failed to disclose the callers’ identities or affiliations, or 
indicate the content of those calls—they merely stated in public meetings 
that they had taken calls.181 
The Idaho Supreme Court held the Council’s failure to provide 
sufficient information about the calls was a violation of the process due to 
interested parties.182  Because the City Council essentially held a “second 
fact-gathering session without . . . notice” or opportunity to rebut 
evidence, its subsequent action could not stand.183 
In making its decision, Idaho’s Supreme Court acknowledged 
Oregon’s harsher rule; still, “[e]ven if this Court were persuaded that 
Tierney and Neuberger express the better rule,” the communications at 
issue here were never disclosed on the record.184  In fact, although the 
 
175.  Cooper v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’r of Ada Cty., 614 P.2d 947 (Idaho 1980) (citing 
Fasano v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’r of Wash. Cty., 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973)).  
176.  See generally Idaho Hist. Pres. Council, Inc. v. City Council of Boise, 8 P.3d 646 
(Idaho 2000) (addressing issue of ex parte communications in quasi-judicial processes before 
municipal boards).  
177.  Id. at 647–48. 
178.  See id. at 649 (citing Cooper, 614 P.2d at 947).  
179.  See Chambers v. Kootenai Cty., 867 P.2d 989, 992 (Idaho 1994) (citing U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV). 
180.  Idaho Hist., 8 P.3d at 648. 
181.  Id. at 650–51. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. at 649. 
184.  Id. at 650; cf. Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722, 725 (Or. 1980) 
(highlighting fact that ongoing, separate sale negotiations had been discussed on the record); 
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language of the Historic Preservation Council decision seems to imply 
that ex parte communications are de facto violations of due process 
protections, the true holding is limited to cases where those 
communications’ existence and content are not disclosed.185 
2. Potent in Theory, Limited by Facts 
At the time of the Historic Preservation Council decision, observers 
assumed that the holding would give Idaho residents challenging 
municipal quasi-judicial decisions more leverage upon showing that 
undisclosed ex parte communications had occurred than their Oregonian 
counterparts.186  Critics feared that holding city councilors to a standard 
requiring them to disclose all contact with constituents regarding a matter 
of public concern or face reversal would have a chilling effect on the roles 
of public servants, which was echoed in the dissent.187 
However, Idaho’s treatment of ex parte communications in quasi-
judicial, municipal proceedings since the Historic Preservation Council 
decision has demonstrated those fears to be unfounded.  Certainly, in cases 
where ex parte communications have functioned as the undisclosed 
second fact-gathering sessions that were of concern in Historic 
Preservation Council, Idaho’s Supreme Court has not hesitated to 
invalidate decisions on those grounds.188  However, there are very few 
instances where all the requisite conditions for overturning decisions on 
this basis have been met.189 
For example, where a county board member had made statements 
indicating prejudgment regarding a proposed boathouse variance; had 
communicated with the permit-seeking parties off the record; and had 
conducted a site-visit without notifying the parties, the Idaho Supreme 
Court found due process violations.190  Again, the concept of un-rebuttable 
fact-finding was at the heart of the court’s decision: “Mueller effectively 
 
Tierney v. Duris, 536 P.2d 435, 443 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (ruling that because ex parte 
communications were disclosed, no due process violation).  
185.  Idaho Hist., 8 P.3d at 651 (“We also hold that the City Council violated due process 
by accepting ex parte [sic] telephone calls without disclosing the names of the callers and the 
substance of the callers’ comments concerning the proposed destruction of the Foster 
Building.”). 
186.  See Michael Asimow, News from the States: Idaho Supreme Court Rules on Ex 
Parte Communications to City Council, 26 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 16, 16–17 (2001). 
187.  Id. (citing Idaho Hist., 8 P.3d at 651–52 (Kidwell, J., dissenting)). 
188.  See Eacret v. Bonner Cty., 86 P.3d 494, 501 (Idaho 2004) (holding that challengers’ 
due process rights were violated by undisclosed ex parte communications), overruled on 
different grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 277 P.3d 353 (Idaho 2012) (pertaining only to 
holding on attorneys’ fees, irrelevant here).  
189.  See Eacret, 86 P.3d at 501.  After review of Idaho appellate law, the author could 
identify this as the only time the absolute ban has been effectuated. 
190.  See id. at 496–97, 499–501. 
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had evidence derived from the ex parte contacts and the unauthorized 
view that was not available to the entire Board or equally to the parties.”191 
The rule Idaho practitioners have derived from Historic Preservation 
Council and the limited cases following its principles is that ex parte 
contacts that provide decision-makers with facts external to the public 
record must be disclosed.192  This rule seems to exclude ex parte 
communications that do not introduce new evidence into the record. 
Communications unrelated to the substance of a quasi-judicial 
proceeding, which may appear to be harmless, can nonetheless imbue a 
decision maker with bias.193  This apparent exclusion of non-factual 
communications leaves a significant gap in Idaho’s protection of 
aggrieved parties.  Idaho’s challengers can only succeed upon a showing 
that undisclosed ex parte communications touched the merits of the 
adjudication at issue—if they fail to make that showing, they are left to 
prove apparent bias.194  For reasons discussed in IV.B supra, actual bias 
is incredibly difficult to prove.  While Idahoans may have a slightly more 
forgiving standard than their Oregonian counterparts, it is little comfort to 
those who find themselves injured by the more subtle, pernicious forms 
of bias.195 
D. A Presumption of Bias: Florida’s Approach 
 As demonstrated by the laws in Oregon and Idaho, nominal 
protection against undisclosed ex parte communications does not 
necessarily solve the more subtle issues presented by those contacts.196  In 
the early 1990s, between Oregon and Idaho establishing their individual 
rules, Floridian courts took a tack nearly opposite Oregon’s.197 
1. The Birth of a Presumption 
In Jennings v. Dade County, a Florida appellate court considered 
whether undisclosed ex parte communications in a zoning variance 
proceeding, where a man sought to turn his residential property into a 
 
191.  Id. at 501. 
192.  See Renee Magee & Joseph H. Groberg, Representing Clients in Land Use 
Decisions—A View from the Inside, 49 ADVOCATE (IDAHO) 15, 15–16 (2006).  
193.  See supra Section III.A.  
194.  See Spencer v. Kootenai Cty., 180 P.3d 487, 493 (Idaho 2008) (holding that 
elements of procedural due process in land use decisions are limited to an opportunity to be 
heard, notice, and the chance to present and rebut all evidence; stating that impartiality is a 
separate issue, and requires substantial proof).  
195.  See supra Part III. 
196.  Id. 
197.  See John W. Howell & David J. Russ, Planning v. Zoning: Snyder Decision 
Changes Rezoning Standards, 68 FLA. B.J. 16, 21 (1994).  
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quick-change oil business, were sufficient to revoke the permit.198  The 
Jennings court held that those communications presented a due process 
issue in the strongest terms: “[e]x parte [sic] communications are 
inherently improper and are anathema to quasi-judicial proceedings.  
Quasi-judicial officers should avoid all such contacts where they are 
identifiable.”199  Further, the court’s language was not limited to 
undisclosed contacts only—the occurrence of any ex parte contact was 
sufficient to trigger the Jennings rule.200 
Florida did not stop at removing the distinction between disclosed 
and undisclosed ex parte communications.  Once a challenger 
demonstrated the existence of those contacts, under the Jennings rule, 
“[their] effect is presumed to be prejudicial unless the defendant proves 
the contrary by competent evidence.”201  This standard (and its legal 
foundation) was reiterated and endorsed by the Florida Supreme Court in 
Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder.202 
Florida’s rule prompted fervent reactions amongst the land-use 
community, ranging from academic concern203 to pragmatic suggestions 
on how to proceed under the recent decisions.204  Participants on all sides 
of quasi-judicial municipal decisions—boards, permit-seekers, 
challengers, and all of their attorneys—were advised to avoid lobbying, 
record and disclose any material, off-the-record communications on the 
merits, but still not fear harmless, pleasantry-type contacts.205  Although 
the courts had instituted a presumption of bias resulting from ex parte 
communications, that presumption was clearly rebuttable, and the nature 
of communications would still play a significant role.206 
2. Powerful, Yet Flexible: The Jennings Presumption and its 
Boundaries 
After the Jennings and Snyder decisions, important questions 
remained as to how strong the presumption resulting from ex parte 
communications was.  Jennings provided some indication, listing 
factors—taken from a seminal administrative law case, Professional Air 
 
198.  Jennings v. Dade Cty., 589 So. 2d 1337, 1339–40 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) 
(noting that communications included benign contact and the hiring of a lobbyist), rev. denied, 
598 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1992). 
199.  Id. at 1341. 
200.  See id. 
201.  Id. 
202.  627 So. 2d 469, 472 (Fla. 1993).  
203.  See generally Paul R. Gougelman III, The Death of Zoning As We Know It, 67 FLA. 
B.J. 25 (1993) (heralding Snyder as the dawn of a new, uncertain era of Florida zoning law).  
204.  See Howell & Russ, supra note 197, at 22–24.  
205.  Id. 
206.  Jennings, 589 So. 2d at 1341. 
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Traffic Controllers Organization v. Federal Labor Relations 
Authority207—that should be considered in evaluating whether 
communications were in fact prejudicial, after the presumption arose.208  
Those factors (hereinafter “Jennings” or “PATCO factors”) included (1) 
the gravity of the communications; (2) the likelihood that the contacts 
influenced the board’s ultimate decision; (3) whether the party who made 
the contacts benefitted from the decision; (4) whether the opposing party 
knew of the content of the contacts therefore having the opportunity to 
rebut their facts; and (5) whether vacating the decision and remanding it 
would serve a useful purpose.209 
Under Florida law, the presumption that arose after showing ex parte 
communications was a “presumption affecting the burden of proof.”210  
Where a presumption is utilized to put into force public policy objectives, 
it is a presumption bearing on proof;211 the presumption of bias upon a 
showing of ex parte communications was instituted in order to promote 
the strong social policy of fundamental fairness in quasi-judicial 
determinations.212  Essentially, the Jennings presumption satisfies the 
burden of production and persuasion.213  Absent any other proof, it both 
establishes bias and is sufficient to base a ruling upon.214  Municipal 
boards presumed biased should testify and introduce other evidence 
regarding the adapted PATCO factors, in order to counter-persuade 
against the presumption.215 
3. Democracy in Action: Eradicating a Promising Judicial 
Solution 
Florida law immediately following Jennings and Snyder seemed to 
resolve the gaps in Oregon and Idaho’s laws, without losing their 
strengths—it gave prospective challengers assurance their claims were 
taken seriously and recognized the more subtle forms of bias that could 
result from ex parte communications.216  However, this solution was short-
lived.  Florida citizens, frustrated because they interpreted Jennings as 
 
207.  685 F.2d 547, 564–65 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (hereinafter “PATCO”).  
208.  See Jennings, 589 So. 2d at 1341 (citing PATCO, 685 F.2d at 564–65 (D.C. Cir. 
1982)).  The PATCO decision will be discussed further in Part V infra.  
209.  See id. 
210.  See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.303–304 (2015) (dividing presumptions into two categories: 
those bearing on the burden of producing evidence, and those bearing on the burden of proof).  
211.  FLA. STAT. § 90.303 (2015).  
212.  See Jennings, 589 So. 2d at 1344–45 (Barkdull, J., concurring).  
213.  Id. 
214.  Id. 
215.  See id. at 1341 (citing Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor Relations 
Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 564–65 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
216.  See supra Section III.A. 
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denying them access to their elected officials, petitioned the legislature for 
help.217 
In 1995, the Florida legislature enacted a statute that required 
disclosure of ex parte communications (including their sender and 
content) on the record in quasi-judicial proceedings before municipal 
boards, thereby removing the judicial presumption instituted in 
Jennings.218  However, this disclosure requirement and presumption 
exception was limited.  It only applied to boards filled by elected officials, 
had no application in local land use decisions, and was only operative if 
adopted by the local body.219  The statute also took special care to ensure 
that Jennings did not retain any force whatsoever over zoning: in local 
land use decisions, no one would be prohibited from communicating with 
a board member by ex parte prohibitions.220  Such communications do not 
need to be disclosed, nor do they create a presumption of bias.221 
Through that statute, Florida’s unique rule governing quasi-judicial 
proceedings before municipal boards was neutered as applicable to the 
very context for which it was instituted—due process protections in local 
land-use decisions.222  It is unclear how the Jennings rule and presumption 
would have prevented citizens from communicating with their elected 
officials.  Because disclosure on the record and whether the ex parte 
communications originated from a party are prominent factors in 
weighing the prejudicial effect of a communication,223 it seems unlikely 
that disclosed communications from non-invested parties would ever be 
cause for vacation of a board decision.  Regardless, Floridians raised their 
voices in protest, and Florida’s brief-lived presumption of bias (along with 
its potential relief for aggrieved citizens) was discarded. 
E. Washington’s Proactive Legislation 
 Unlike the other states addressed to this point, Washington did not 
wait for a case to present itself before addressing ex parte 
communications.  In the early 1980s, the legislature enacted a statute, 
claiming the first and (to date) final word on the issue.224  Under section 
42.36.060 of the Washington Revised Code, ex parte communications 
 
217.  Bernard R. Appleman, Can Florida’s Legislative Standard of Review for Small-
Scale Land Use Amendments be Justified?, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 305, 337 (2006).  
218.  FLA. STAT. § 286.0115(1) (2015).  
219.  FLA. STAT. § 286.0115 (2015). 
220.  FLA. STAT. § 286.0115(2)(c) (2015). 
221.  Id. 
222.  See Jennings v. Dade Cty., 589 So. 2d 1337, 1344–45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) 
(Barkdull, J., concurring). 
223.  See id. at 1341 (citing Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor Relations 
Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 564–65 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
224.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060 (2015).  
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between any member of a decision-making body and opponents or 
proponents of a pending quasi-judicial measure are forbidden, unless two 
conditions are met.225  First, the substance of any such contact must be 
placed on the record.226  Second, the content of the messages and a party’s 
right to rebut that content must be announced at any proceeding where the 
measure is in determination.227 
Washington’s statutory text answers the fears that the Florida statute 
sought to assuage, without denying relief to parties aggrieved by 
undisclosed ex parte contacts: the prohibition does not “preclude 
correspondence between a citizen and his or her elected official if any such 
correspondence is made a part of the record when it pertains to the subject 
matter of a quasi-judicial proceeding.”228  The fundamental requirement 
remains disclosure on the record.229  Washington found no need to 
dispense with it, despite the elected nature of a board member.230 
Other provisions of Washington’s Revised Code preclude some ex 
parte contacts from the disclosure requirement.231  For example, if 
contacts are made by virtue of a board member carrying on the business 
of his or her office, unrelated to the matter in determination, they need not 
be disclosed and do not violate quasi-judicial due process.232  This 
provision makes clear that ex parte contacts will only matter if they 
reference the merits or material facts of a current adjudication. 
Also, no person who, in the process of running for elected office, 
comments on the merits of a situation that they must later rule on as a 
result of being elected to office violates due process on the basis of those 
earlier comments.233  That section allays any concerns that public-minded 
prospective officials will refrain from civic engagement, or that candidates 
will be unavailable to citizens, as communications made in such contexts 
are totally harmless under the statute.234 
However, the Washington statutes requiring and exempting 
disclosure leave a significant question unspoken and unanswered: what 
happens when municipal quasi-judicial decision-makers do not disclose 
ex parte communications when required?  Unlike the brief Jennings-
Snyder regime in Florida, the Washington statute provides no convenient 
 
225.  Id. 
226.  WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060(1) (2015). 
227.  WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060(2) (2015). 
228.  Id. 
229.  See id. 
230.  Cf. FLA. STAT. § 286.0115(2)(c) (2015). 
231.  WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.36.020, 42.36.040 (2015); see discussion infra. 
232.  WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.020 (2015).  This Section is applicable to any board 
member and any constituent—even those with matters currently before the board.  Id.  
233.  WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.040 (2015).  
234.  Id. 
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list of factors to determine the prejudicial effect of a communication, nor 
a presumption to aid those challenging decisions.235 
Rather, proceedings where ex parte communications are not 
disclosed when otherwise required are reviewed under a common-law 
doctrine called “the appearance of fairness.”236  Under that doctrine, 
decisions reached by a municipal body in a quasi-judicial proceeding must 
be fair in both fact and appearance.237  If a “reasonably prudent and 
disinterested observer” would perceive a quasi-judicial proceeding to be 
unfair, it is treated as such, and therefore invalid.238  Unfairness can 
manifest in several ways, but generally takes the form of three classic 
biases: prejudgment, hostility and favoritism, and personal interest.239 
The appearance of fairness doctrine theoretically provides some 
relief to parties left disappointed with the results of a quasi-judicial 
municipal determination, assuming they can show ex parte 
communications were made that should have been disclosed.240  Ex parte 
contacts bear on issues of prejudgment, favoritism, and interest—all 
critical concerns under the doctrine.241  One can imagine the litigants from 
Neuberger or 1000 Friends succeeding under the doctrine: the off-the-
record business dealings in those cases certainly lead to a reasonable 
inference of some apparent unfairness.242 
Still, the appearance of fairness doctrine is no silver bullet resolving 
the issue.  Because of its potentially broad application, Washington courts 
have been reluctant to apply it, to the point that it may essentially be dead-
letter law.243  Indeed, where the courts discuss the appearance of fairness 
doctrine, they consistently find it has not been violated.244 
 
235.  See supra Section IV.D.  
236.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.020 (2015); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.040 
(2015).  These sections, in their most technical operation, announce situations where ex parte 
communications are not reported, triggering the doctrine of appearance of fairness, but are 
exempted from said doctrine.  Id. 
237.  See Carolyn M. Van Noy, Comment, The Appearance of Fairness Doctrine: A 
Conflict in Values, 61 WASH. L. REV.  533, 534 (1986).  
238.  W.T. Watterson, Comment, What Ever Happened to the Appearance of Fairness 
Doctrine? Local Land Use Decisions in an Age of Statutory Progress, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
653, 654 (1998). 
239.  Id. at 658–59 (citing Buell v. Bremerton, 495 P.2d 1358, 1362 (Wash. 1972)).  
240.  See id.  
241.  Id. at 659. 
242.  See Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722, 725–26 (Or. 1980); see also 1000 
Friends of Oregon v. Wasco Cty. Ct., 742 P.2d 39, 40 (Or. 1987). 
243.  Watterson, supra note 238, at 666.  Between 1982 and the date of this Note’s 
publication, Washington’s higher courts had not held a single violation of the doctrine in land-
use contexts.  Id.  
244.  See Org. to Pres. Agr. Lands v. Adams Cty., 913 P.2d 793, 804–05 (Wash. 1996) 
(holding undisclosed ex parte communications were at worst duplicative of facts already on the 
record and did not violate appearance of fairness doctrine); see also Bjarnson v. Kitsap Cty., 
899 P.2d 1290, 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that rehearing excluding official tainted 
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Just as an apparently unfair proceeding would be invalid, an 
apparently fair one would be valid.245  This presents a significant problem 
to potential challengers of quasi-judicial actions: more subtle forms of bias 
(which could be referred to under the umbrella of favoritism) are not 
apparent in the same way that interest or prejudgment may be.246  A 
proceeding could appear to be fair, but in fact be tainted by impropriety.247  
Even the appearance of fairness doctrine requires “sufficient evidence 
demonstrating bias, such as personal or pecuniary interest on the part of 
commissioner; mere speculation is not enough.”248  Ultimately, the 
appearance of fairness doctrine seems to present the same obstacle of 
proof of bias as a standard requiring actual, proven bias.249 
Beyond its inherent weaknesses, there is a practical problem in the 
appearance of fairness doctrine.  Were it to be a part of a standard for other 
jurisdictions, those jurisdictions would need an already-developed body 
of common law relating to quasi-judicial decision-makers’ partiality.250  
Washington is the only state with such a background, and the only state 
that has ever fully endorsed the doctrine.251 
While Washington’s combination of statutory regime with common-
law relief could feasibly help those who seek to challenge quasi-judicial 
municipal action, its practical restraints and judicial reluctance limit its 
potential, both within and beyond Washington.  Although Washington’s 
system provides some positive attributes, a model rule for the handling of 
ex parte communications needs to be clearer in order to provide a 
meaningful opportunity for relief to aggrieved parties. 
V. LEGISLATURE AND JUDICIARY IN HARMONY: THE FEDERAL 
 
by ex parte communications satisfied appearance doctrine); Snohomish Cty. Improvement All. 
v. Snohomish Cty., 808 P.2d 781, 786–87 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (ruling that campaign 
contributions by interested parties to council members were not ex parte communications, so 
failure to disclose was not unfair). 
245.  See Van Noy, supra note 237, at 534. 
246.  See, e.g., Bunko v. City of Puyallup Civil Service Comm’n, 975 P.2d 1055, 1057, 
1060–61 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).  In Bunko, the lower court had found that several informal 
conversations indicating friendship between employment commission and police chief—
including condolences on deaths in the family, thanks for personal advice on firearm purchases, 
and complaints about office staff at the police department—during the course of plaintiff’s 
grievance hearing violated appearance of fairness doctrine.  Id.  The appeals court reversed, 
saying that the conversations had nothing to do with “the matter in determination,” contrary to 
statutory requirements.  Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060 (2015). 
247.  See supra Part III. 
248.  Bunko, 975 P.2d at 1060. 
249.  Cf. supra Section IV.C. 
250.  See generally Van Noy, supra note 237 (tracing the history of the doctrine from 
Washington’s early judicial history to the present).  
251.  See Watterson, supra note 238, at 654–55.  
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GOVERNMENT’S SOLUTION 
The handling of ex parte communications in the municipal quasi-
judicial context is, by its very terms, a state-level legal issue.  However, 
that does not render federal law irrelevant in determining the best way to 
handle the issue.  Aside from municipal boards, quasi-judicial proceedings 
arise in another significant context: federal administrative law.252 
Administrative law controls the relationships between government 
agencies, the entities they regulate, the beneficiaries of their actions, and 
the federal judiciary’s review of those actions.253  The Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”)254 governs almost all aspects of administrative 
law. 
Pursuant to the APA, agencies exercise two primary functions in 
carrying out their broader business of administrating federal laws and 
policy: rulemaking and adjudication.255  When an agency issues a 
statement of general (or particular) applicability that has future effect, and 
future effect only, that agency participates in rulemaking.256  By contrast, 
when an agency formulates an order257 specific to one party, it participates 
in adjudication.258  For example, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) may make a rule regarding emissions from automobiles; that rule 
applies to all auto manufacturers equally, and its creation is rulemaking.259  
If, however, the EPA sought to force one particular manufacturer to stop 
violating that rule, then it would be adjudicating the matter. 
An agency, therefore, has dual natures: it is both legislative and 
judicial, exercising both functions in its broader role as an administrator 
of the law.260  Accordingly, agency actions can be characterized as quasi-
legislative, or quasi-judicial.261  The direct nexus between administrative 
agencies and municipal bodies is evident—both are bodies of dual nature 
and purpose, and accordingly incur different obligations depending on the 
 
252.  See FUNK ET. AL., supra note 53, at 22 (noting that adjudication—a critical agency 
function—corresponds with the judicial process). 
253.  See Administrative law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also FUNK 
ET. AL., supra note 53, at 5–6. 
254.  5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2015).   
255.  5 U.S.C. § 551 (2015).  
256.  5 U.S.C. § 551(4)–(5) (2015). 
257.  5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2015) (“‘[O]rder’ means the whole or a part of a final disposition, 
whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other 
than rule making but including licensing . . . .”).  
258.  5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2015).  
259.  See generally Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (regarding attempts to 
institute EPA emissions rulemaking). 
260.  See FUNK ET. AL., supra note 53, at 21–22. 
261.  Id. (noting that some actions are like those of congresses, while some are like those 
of courts). 
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actions they engage in.262  It is therefore instructive to examine how 
administrative law treats ex parte communications when they arise in the 
quasi-judicial context. 
The APA provision governing adjudication is only triggered under 
certain circumstances, where the legislature has intended hearings to be 
conducted under formal, trial-like procedures.263  Once triggered, APA 
adjudication requires an agency to follow specific processes.264  Among 
these mandatory procedural protections is a provision prohibiting ex parte 
communications on the merits in a proceeding between any interested 
party and the agency (including intra-agency discussion).265 
If any prohibited communications occur, then the APA requires the 
communications—including written documents, summary of oral 
contacts, and all responses made to ex parte communications—be placed 
on the record.266  Additionally, the agency may require the party who made 
a prohibited contact to demonstrate why his or her interest in the 
proceeding should not be “dismissed, denied, disregarded, or otherwise 
adversely affected.”267 
When, however, prohibited communications are not disclosed, a 
decision is not de facto invalid.268  Rather, undisclosed ex parte contacts 
render the agency decision voidable.269  This is true even where an 
adjudication was never required to follow APA procedures on grounds of 
procedural due process.270  A reviewing court must decide whether the 
“process was irrevocably tainted so as to make the ultimate judgment of 
the agency unfair . . . .”271 
To determine this, courts turn to the PATCO factors adopted by 
 
262.  See supra Parts I, II.  
263.  5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2015) (“[I]n every case of adjudication required by statute to be 
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing . . . .”  (emphasis added)). 
264.  5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (2015).  These provisions also apply to hearings conducted 
pursuant to APA § 553, informally called formal rulemaking.  Formal rulemaking is incredibly 
rare, and beyond the scope of this Note.  See id.; see also FUNK ET. AL., supra note 53, at 51. 
265.  5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2015). 
266.  5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(C) (2015).  
267.  5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(D) (2015). 
268.  See Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor Relations Authority, 685 F.2d 
547, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“In sum, Congress sought to establish common-sense guidelines to 
govern ex parte [sic] contacts in administrative hearings, rather than rigidly defined and 
woodenly applied rules.”).  
269.  Id. at 564. 
270.  See supra Section III.  Cases arising from non-APA adjudications have revolved 
around whether ex parte communications were “so substantial and so likely to cause prejudice” 
that the resulting decision cannot stand.  Stone v. FDIC, 179 F.3d 1368, 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (dismissing government’s argument for a test requiring proof of contacted official’s 
subjective intent).  
271.  PATCO, 685 F.2d at 564. 
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Florida in Jennings,272 weighing (1) the seriousness of the contacts; (2) the 
effect of the contacts on the ultimate decision; (3) the beneficiary of the 
action and whether he or she made the contacts; (4) if the communications 
were not merely undisclosed, but unknown to the other party; and (5) 
whether remand would have any meaningful effect.273  Taken together, 
these factors implicate a fact-heavy analysis of situations on a case-by-
case basis.  They consider both objective factors—what is the decision, 
and how does it appear in light of ex parte communications—and 
subjective ones: what does it seem the administrative tribunal took from 
these communications?274 
This standard is identical to the one briefly adopted by Florida 
(without a stated presumption of bias),275 and bears significant similarities 
to the appearance of fairness doctrine as well.276  Additionally, it fills gaps 
left by Idaho’s limited rule while avoiding the draconian proof 
requirements seen in Oregon.277  The law surrounding the doctrine is much 
further developed than that seen in the states.  As discussion infra will 
address, the administrative solution to ex parte communications in quasi-
judicial determinations presents a compelling starting point for any 
potential model rule. 
VI. A MODEL PROPOSAL: STANDARDIZING, YET AVOIDING, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
Taking into consideration the solutions proposed by both the states278 
and the Federal Government,279 the first step of a solution is eminently 
clear: any state addressing the issue of ex parte communications in a 
quasi-judicial context should adopt a disclosure requirement.  Every 
authority that has tackled the issue has, in some way, utilized the 
mechanism.280 
 
272.  Jennings v. Dade Cty., 589 So. 2d 1337, 1341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (citing 
PATCO, 685 F.2d at 564–65); see supra Section IV.D. 
273.  PATCO, 685 F.2d at 564–65. 
274.  The PATCO court’s balancing test is compatible with the fact-specific inquiry into 
whether ex parte communications were so susceptible to creating bias that the decision cannot 
stand set out in Stone.  Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377.   
275.  See supra Section IV.D.  
276.  See supra Section IV.E.  
277.  Compare supra Section IV.C, with supra Section IV.B.  
278.  See supra Part IV.  
279.  See supra Part V. 
280.  See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(C) (2015) (mandating disclosure subject to sanctions); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060 (2015) (requiring disclosure, otherwise triggering appearance 
of fairness doctrine); OR. REV. STAT. § 215.422(3) (2015) (allowing for disclosure to quell 
potential issues); see also Idaho Historic Pres. Council, Inc. v. City Council of Boise, 8 P.3d 
646, 649 (Idaho 2000) (noting disclosure may have led to different holding); Jennings v. Dade 
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There is no doubt that quasi-judicial proceedings implicate due 
process, and ex parte communications present possible due process 
violations.281  Applying the Mathews test for particular due process 
procedures,282 it is evident that disclosure is required.  First, there are some 
of the most essential private interests at issue in municipal board hearings: 
property, liberty, and the resulting procedural right to a fair hearing before 
a fair tribunal.283  The measure would cost the government nothing, and 
both increase public faith in municipal boards while simultaneously 
preventing the expense of potential litigation, as any cause of action would 
be moot.284  Finally, disclosing ex parte communications on the record 
cures any possible erroneous deprivation that would result from their 
existence by giving parties an opportunity to rebut their content.285 
Required disclosure alone is not enough, as it does not provide for 
what should happen when contacts are not disclosed.  Another great 
strength of the APA is its explicit balancing test for weighing the 
prejudicial effect of undisclosed ex parte contacts.286  Allowing for a fact-
based determination of the actual prejudicial effect of such contacts287 
without requiring absolute proof that the contacts resulted in prejudice 
provides plaintiffs more latitude in proving their claims.288  At the same 
time, such a test prevents potentially over-reactive de facto invalidation,289 
and prevents situations that may appear unfair, but in fact are completely 
above-board from being exploited.290 
Still, the PATCO factors291 leave one major gap in coverage: what 
happens to plaintiffs who can only demonstrate persistent, subtle 
influence?292  In a situation such as Cernak, where a plaintiff can show a 
 
Cty., 589 So. 2d 1337, 1341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (requiring disclosure, although even 
disclosed ex parte communications opened action to invalidation). 
281.  See supra Part II. 
282.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
283.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 
(1970). 
284.  See, e.g., Tierney v. Duris, 536 P.2d 435, 443 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that 
disclosed ex parte communications did not implicate due process). 
285.  Cf. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (holding that pre-deprivation hearing would be no 
more effective at preventing erroneous deprivation than a post-deprivation hearing).  
286.  See Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 
564–65 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
287.  Id. at 564–65. 
288.  Cf. Neuberger v. Portland, 607 P.2d 722, 725 (Or. 1980). 
289.  Of the kind feared after Idaho Historic Pres. Council, Inc. v. City Council of Boise, 
8 P.3d 646 (Idaho 2000). 
290.  See Van Noy, supra note 237, at 564. 
291.  See PATCO, 685 F.2d at 564–65.  The PATCO factors are mostly concerned with 
communications that are apparently prejudicial—weighty communications with a demonstrable 
effect on the deciding body’s decision.  Id. 
292.  See, e.g., Cernak Memorandum, supra note 6.   
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pattern of the relatively mundane contacts being continuously made to 
make relations friendlier, that person must still prove a prejudicial effect 
from them—none of the PATCO factors would provide recourse.293  
However, psychological studies indicate that those communications—
already recognized as problematic and prohibited—can have substantial 
effect on a board member’s decision.294 
This issue can be resolved with the Jennings presumption, which 
shone brightly and briefly in Florida in the early 1990s.295  By presuming 
bias upon the showing of undisclosed ex parte communications,296 courts 
can recognize those subtler forms of bias that result from repetition, 
familiarity, and availability.297  Presumptions have four general functions: 
(1) to place a burden where it is most likely to be carried—that is, with the 
party who can best access proof; (2) to put into effect substantive policy 
choices; (3) to recognize what is probably true; and (4) to allow for proof 
where it may be impossible.298 
Presumptions are common throughout America’s civil 
courtrooms.299  In a situation such as this, bias from undisclosed ex parte 
communications may be incredibly hard to prove for a plaintiff, and the 
defendant board will have the best access to proof of the communications’ 
effects.300  Additionally, given the strong potential of ex parte 
communications to bear on well-established cognitive biases, a 
presumption would recognize a probable truth of some quantum of bias.301 
Like the presumption instituted in Jennings, this presumption would 
be far from conclusive.  While not so weak that the slightest quantum of 
evidence presented against the presumption would defeat it,302 the 
 
293.  See PATCO, 685 F.2d at 564–65.  The gravity of the contacts is low; they did not 
bear on material matters; it is hard to say the decision of the ZBA relied on them.  See Cernak 
v. Planning Bd. for the City of Easthampton, No. 10-035, *4–6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Hampshire 
Cty., Mar. 26, 2013) (on file with author). 
294.  See supra Section III.A.  
295.  Jennings v. Dade Cty., 589 So. 2d 1337, 1344–45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) 
(Barkdull, J., concurring). 
296.  Cf. id. at 1341.  Jennings would have invoked its presumption upon the showing of 
any ex parte communications.  Id.  This Note proposes removing that automatic trigger, as it 
does not seem to serve a useful purpose—if contacts are disclosed, there is fair opportunity for 
rebuttal and counter-persuasion.   
297.  See Zajonc, supra note 102, at 224; Schwarz et. al., supra note 97, at 200–01; Swap, 
supra note 105, at 248. 
298.  CHRISTOPHER R. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 116 (5th ed. 
2012).  
299.  Id. at 117.  In fact, there are so many that creating an exhaustive list is impractical 
and unhelpful.  Id. 
300.  See, e.g., Cernak Memorandum, supra note 6, at *20–23 (discussing ZBA testimony 
on the effects of communications).  
301.  See supra Section III.A.  
302.  See generally Cappuccio v. Prime Capital Funding, LLC, 649 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 
2011) (discussing the “bursting bubble” presumptions).  Bursting bubble presumptions take 
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presumption of bias would only serve to give the plaintiff some proof to 
build upon in persuading the jurors or bench of a PATCO/Jennings-factor 
impact.303  This balance would still favor the board—assuming there was 
in fact no bias, and the communications were indeed harmless, a plaintiff 
could not win on the presumption alone. 
A disclosure requirement is a common-sense step in clearly 
delineating the obligations of all parties to a quasi-judicial municipal 
proceeding, as well as a stepping-off point for allowing judicial review of 
those proceedings on the issue of ex parte communications.  If ex parte 
communications are disclosed—absent other procedural or substantive 
defaults—there is no reason to institute judicial review.  If, however, they 
are left hidden, courts should assume they had a prejudicial effect, until 
persuaded otherwise.  This regime strikes the proper balance between 
respecting the due process rights of citizens and leaving their municipal 
boards with a manageable standard. 
CONCLUSION 
By the very nature of procedural due process doctrine, any issue that 
potentially violates its guarantees is fraught with inconsistency and 
confusion.  However, this is not prohibitive in establishing safeguards for 
those who seek its protections in quasi-judicial municipal proceedings. 
There is no doubt ex parte communications present serious risks of 
bias and determinations made on facts that are not included in the 
record.304  Sufficient case law has developed around attempts to combat 
these risks to demonstrate what works, and what does not.  Under a rule 
requiring absolute proof of bias, plaintiffs who demonstrate circumstantial 
evidence of a cash-for-votes scheme (such as those in 1000 Friends) are 
left in the cold.305  Under a rule rendering ex parte communications de 
facto due process violations, harmless—even accidental—contacts could 
leave a municipal board unable to function.306 
As with any measure of procedural due process, the proposal must 
balance the governmental and individual interests, along with the effect 
 
only the slightest rebuttal to disappear.  In this context, mere testimony by board members that 
ex parte communications had no effect would erase the presumption, and leave plaintiffs 
without any proof, defeating the purpose of a presumption altogether.  See MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 298, at 122–23.  
303.  See id. at 123–24.  Where no evidence either mandating a finding for the 
presumption or against it is available, the parties are left to persuasion on whatever evidence 
there is.  Id.   
304.  See supra Parts II, III, V. 
305.  See supra Section IV.B.  
306.  See supra Section IV.C. 
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on the risk of erroneous deprivation.307  Allowing for initial disclosure of 
ex parte communications to cure subsequent issues—an act that is easy 
for the government, protects the strong individual rights in play, and 
removes risk of faulty outcome—places the ball firmly in the municipal 
body’s court.  If they fail to follow that clear, simple requirement, it is fair 
to assume they did so for a reason, and presume them biased.308 
At that point, the reasonable fact finder’s opinion will rule the day—
the county commissioner extorting constituents for above-market cattle 
sales will be overturned; the ZBA member who speaks with a constituent 
in passing about a grocery store will not be.  Every interested party will 
receive a procedure (on the municipal level and beyond) that is fact-based 
and fundamentally fair. 
 
 
307.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (discussing the due process 
balancing test).  
308.  See supra Section IV.D, Part V, Part VI. 
